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Abstract In the field of cooperative games, there is an extensive literature that studies
situations of restricted cooperation. In a communication graph game, players can only
cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication
possibilities. The Myerson value of such a game is obtained by taking the Shapley
value of the corresponding restricted game. For the special case that the graph is cycle-
free and connected, for each player the corresponding hierarchical outcome yields an
alternative solution. In a permission tree game, the player set is enriched with a rooted
directed graph (or tree) on the set of players. A coalition is said to be feasible, if for
every player in the coalition, except the top (root) player, also its predecessor belong(s)
to the coalition. The permission value is obtained by taking the Shapley value of the
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associated restricted game. In this paper,wemodify theMyerson value andhierarchical
outcome that are defined for (undirected) communication graph games to a value for
permission tree games. We also define a new solution that assigns all payoff to the
unique top player in the hierarchy. Then comparable characterizations are given of
these three solutions and the known permission value.
Keywords Cooperative TU-game · Permission tree · Myerson value · Hierarchical
outcome · Permission value · Axiomatization
JEL Classification C71
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, consists of a finite
set of players and a characteristic function that assigns aworth to any subset (coalition)
of players. A (single-valued) solution is a function that assigns to every game a vector
of individual payoffs to the players. One of the most applied efficient solutions for
cooperative TU-games is the Shapley value (Shapley 1953).1
A classical TU-game describes a situation in which any coalition of players can
cooperate and earn its worth. However, in most economic and political organizations
not every coalition is feasible. Therefore, in the literature various models involving
restrictions on coalition formation have been developed. The well-known model of
communication graph games, introduced byMyerson (1977), studies situations where
it is no longer assumed that any coalition of players can cooperate because they are
unable to communicate.Myersonmodels this by an undirected graph inwhich the links
represent the communication relations between the players. A coalition is unrestricted
with respect to cooperation, or feasible, if it is connected in the graph. The Myerson
value for communication graph games is the solution that assigns to every commu-
nication graph game the Shapley value of its corresponding restricted game, being
the game in which the worth of any coalition is given by the sum of the worths of its
components within the graph. For cycle-free and connected communication graphs,
Demange (2004) introduced the notion of hierarchical outcome. Given a player i ,
Demange considered the graph as a rooted tree with player i as the unique top player.
Then the hierarchical outcome with respect to i is the payoff vector that assigns to
any player its marginal contribution in the Myerson restricted game to the coalition
of all its subordinates in the rooted tree. So, for any i there is a corresponding hierar-
chical outcome vector. Since for superadditive games each vector is in the core of the
restricted game, Demange argued that ‘hierarchy yields stability.’
Restrictions on cooperation might also appear because players are part of a hierar-
chical organization. Ingameswith a permission structure, the hierarchical organization
is modeled by a directed graph. Cooperation is restricted in the sense that a player
1 The Shapley value is applied in, e.g., Graham et al. (1990), Maniquet (2003), Chun (2006), Ni and Wang
(2007), Tauman andWatanabe (2007), van den Brink et al. (2007), Bergantinõs and Lorenzo-Freire (2008),
Ligett et al. (2009), and Dong et al. (2012).
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needs permission to cooperate from players that are higher in the hierarchy. In the
conjunctive approach, introduced in Gilles et al. (1992), a coalition is feasible, if and
only if for every player in the coalition also all its predecessors (in the directed graph)
belong to the coalition. In the disjunctive approach, developed in Gilles and Owen
(1994), a coalition is feasible if and only if for every player in the coalition at least
one of his predecessors (if any) also belongs to the coalition. The conjunctively (dis-
junctively) restricted game is the TU-game in which the worth of a coalition is given
by the worth of its maximal feasible subcoalition.2
We consider games with a permission structure that is given by a rooted tree,
to be called permission tree games. In a rooted tree, each player has at most one
predecessor, so the conjunctively and disjunctively restricted games coincide. We call
this the permission restricted game. The permission value is the solution that assigns to
any permission tree game the Shapley value of its corresponding permission restricted
game. For permission tree games, van den Brink et al. (2015) introduced the Average
Tree permission value and gave comparable axiomatizations of this value and the
permission value.
In this paper we introduce three new solutions for permission tree games. First,
we apply the Myerson value by assigning to every permission tree game the Myerson
value of the underlying undirected communication graph game. Second, we define
the hierarchical outcome of a permission tree game as the hierarchical outcome cor-
responding to the root (i.e., top player) of the permission tree. The third new solution
assigns to every permission tree game the hierarchical outcome corresponding to the
root of the permission restricted game. We provide a set of nine axioms to compare
three new solutions with each other and with the permission value. It appears that all
four solutions satisfy five of the nine axioms and that each solution is characterized
by these five axioms and precisely two of the remaining four axioms. Moreover, five
axioms are incompatible with two remaining combinations of two of the four other
axioms.
A typology of four solutions is made, based on a number of criteria. The coopera-
tion restrictions underlying the Myerson value and the hierarchical outcome give the
hierarchy some flavor of communication according to these solutions. Players located
at upper levels of the hierarchy serve to connect players at lower levels, but players
who are not connecting lower level players do not need to give permission to these
players. Coalitions can be feasible even if not all predecessors are present. On the
other hand, according to the permission value and the top value the hierarchy has the
flavor of a permission structure. Coalitions are only feasible if for all players their
predecessors are also present. Considering the distribution of payoff, the Myerson
value and the permission value have in common that they treat players, that are in
some sense equally important in generating worth under their respective cooperation
restrictions, equally. The hierarchical outcome and top value have in common that they
2 Games with a permission structure are a special class of games on antimatroids (see Algaba et al. 2004)
which are contained in the class of games on union closed systems, see van den Brink et al. (2011).
Permission tree games where the game is inessential are called peer group games, see Brânzei et al. (2002).
Other models of games with a hierarchy on the set of players are, for example, Faigle and Kern (1992) and
Li and Li (2011) or the more general model of Derks and Peters (1993).
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assign payoffs fully to their respective top players (being the root player as global top
for the top value, and the local top player who is the highest in connecting a coalition
for the hierarchical outcome).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of preliminaries on cooperative
TU-games, digraphs and permission tree games. Section 3 gives four solutions for
permission tree games, and Sect. 4 gives the axioms and the characterization results.
In Sect. 5, the typology of the four solutions is discussed.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative TU-games
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a pair (N , v),
where N ⊆ IN is a finite set of players and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function on
N satisfying v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is theworth that coalition S can
obtain from cooperation. For game (N , v) and S ⊆ N , (S, vS) denotes the subgame of
(N , v) on S, given by vS(T ) = v(T ), T ⊆ S. For i ∈ N , we denote N \{i} by N−i and
the subgame (N−i , vN−i ) by (N−i , v−i ). Game (N , v) is monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T )
when S ⊆ T ⊆ N . We denote by G and GM , respectively, the class of all TU-games
and all monotone TU-games.
For two games (N , v), (N , w) ∈ G, the game (N , v +w) is given by (v +w)(S) =
v(S)+w(S) for all S ⊆ N . For game (N , v) ∈ G and scalar c ∈ IR, the game (N , cv)
is given by (cv)(S) = c · v(S) for all S ⊆ N . The null game (N , v0) is given by
v0(S) = 0 for every S ⊆ N . For each R ⊆ N , R = ∅, the unanimity game (N , uR)
is given by uR(S) = 1 if R ⊆ S, and uR(S) = 0 otherwise. It is well known that
for every game (N , v) ∈ G it holds that v = ∑∅=R⊆N v(R)uR , i.e., v is a linear
combination of the unanimity games, where the coefficients v(R) are the Harsanyi
dividends, see Harsanyi (1959).
A payoff vector of TU-game (N , v) is a vector x ∈ IRN giving a payoff xi ∈ IR
to any player i ∈ N . A (single-valued) solution for TU-games is a function f that
assigns to every game (N , v) ∈ G a payoff vector f (N , v) ∈ IRN . The best-known
solution is the Shapley value (Shapley 1953), denoted by Sh. This value distributes
the dividends of every coalition T uniformly among the members of T , thus




|T | , i ∈ N .
2.2 Digraphs
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N , D), where N is a set of nodes and the
collection of ordered pairs D ⊆ {(i, j)|i, j ∈ N , i = j} is a set of arcs. In this paper
the nodes represent the players in a game. We denote the set of all digraphs by D.
For S ⊆ N , the digraph (S, D(S)) with D(S) = {(i, j) ∈ D|i, j ∈ S} is called
the subgraph of D on S. For i ∈ N , the nodes in FD(i) := { j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ D} are
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called the followers of i , and the nodes in PD(i) := { j ∈ N | ( j, i) ∈ D} are called
the predecessors of i . For S ⊆ N , we denote FD(S) = ⋃i∈S FD(i) and PD(S) =⋃
i∈S PD(i). Given (N , D) ∈ D, a sequence of k different players (i1, . . . , ik) is
a (directed) path if (il , il+1) ∈ D for l = 1, . . . , k − 1. The transitive closure of
(N , D) ∈ D is the digraph (N , tr(D)) where for any pair i, j ∈ N , i = j , it holds
that (i, j) ∈ tr(D) if and only if there is a directed path from i to j . We refer
to the players in F̂D(i) = Ftr(D)(i) as the subordinates of i and to the players in
P̂D(i) = { j ∈ N | i ∈ F̂D( j)} as the superiors of i . Also, for S ⊆ N , we denote
F̂D(S) = ∪i∈S F̂D(i) and P̂D(S) = ∪i∈S P̂D(i).
In a digraph (N , D) player i ∈ N is called top player when PD(i) = ∅. A digraph
(N , D) is a rooted tree with root i when (i) player i is the unique top player and (ii)
for each j = i there is a unique directed path from i to j . Note that this implies that
|PD( j)| = 1 for all j = i . In the sequel we denote by Dt the class of directed rooted
trees and an element of Dt by (N , T ). We denote the unique top player in (N , T ) by
Top(N , T ).
2.3 Permission tree games
A game with a permission structure is a triple (N , v, D) with N ⊂ N a finite set of
players, (N , v) ∈ G a TU-game and (N , D) ∈ D a digraph on N . In those games it
is assumed that the players are organized in a hierarchy given by the directed graph.
The hierarchy imposes restrictions on the forming of coalitions. In the conjunctive
approach to permission structures as developed in Gilles et al. (1992) and van den
Brink and Gilles (1996), a coalition is feasible if and only if for every player in the
coalition all its predecessors are also in the coalition. In the disjunctive approach
developed in Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997), a coalition is feasible
if and only if for every non-top player in the coalition at least one of its predecessors
is also in the coalition. In this paper we only consider triples (N , v, T ) with the
permission structure (N , T ) ∈ Dt a rooted tree. We denote by GT the collection of all
(N , v, T )with (N , T ) a rooted tree and refer to these games as permission tree games.
A (single-valued) solution f on GT assigns a unique payoff vector f (N , v, T ) ∈ RN
to every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT .
On the class GT the conjunctive and disjunctive approaches coincide and for a tree
(N , T ) the set of feasible coalitions is given by
T = {S ⊆ N |PT (i) ⊆ S for all i ∈ S } .
For S ⊆ N , let σT (S) = ⋃R∈T :R⊆S R be the largest feasible subset3 of S. Following
the references above, the induced permission restricted game of (N , v, T ) is the game
(N , rN ,v,T ) ∈ G given by
rN ,v,T (S) = v(σT (S)) for all S ⊆ N , (2.1)
3 Every coalition having a unique largest feasible subset follows from the fact that T is union closed, i.e.,
for every E, F ∈ T it holds that E ∪ F ∈ T .
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and the permission value ϕ on GT is the solution that assigns to each (N , v, T ) the
Shapley value of the associated permission restricted game, thus
ϕ(N , v, T ) = Sh(N , rN ,v,T ) for all (N , v, T ) ∈ GT .
3 Three new solutions for permission tree games
In this section we define three solutions for permission tree games. The first one is the
Myerson value. This value has been introduced byMyerson (1977) for communication
graph games. A communication graph game is a triple (N , v, L) with (N , v) a TU-
game and (N , L) an undirected (communication) graph, i.e., L ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈ N , i =
j} is a collection of undirected pairs of two elements of N . The so-called Myerson




v(T ) for all S ⊆ N , (3.1)
where CL(S) is the set of components of S in the subgraph (S, L(S)).4 So, vL(S) =
v(S)when S is connected; otherwise, vL (S) is the sumof theworths of its components.
The Myerson value μ on the class of communication graph games is defined by
μ(N , v, L) = Sh(N , vL). For a directed rooted tree (N , T ) ∈ Dt , let (N , LT ) ∈ L be
the corresponding undirected (connected and cycle-free) communication graph given
by LT = {{i, j} : (i, j) ∈ T or ( j, i) ∈ T }. The Myerson value for permission tree
games now assigns to every permission tree game the Myerson value of the associated
communication graph game.
Definition 3.1 The Myerson value for permission tree games is the solution μ given
by
μ(N , v, T ) = Sh(N , vLT ) for all (N , v, T ) ∈ GT .
The second solution is the hierarchical outcome. On the class of cycle-free and
connected communication graph games, Demange (2004) defined for each player
i ∈ N its corresponding hierarchical outcome. We define the hierarchical outcome
for permission tree games as the solution that for every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT assigns the
hierarchical outcome of (N , LT ) with respect to the unique top player Top(N , T ).
We denote this solution by η.5
Definition 3.2 The hierarchical outcome for permission tree games is the solution η
given by
4 Given (N , L), a coalition K ⊆ N is connected if either K is a singleton or there is path in the subgraph
(K , L(K )) between any two distinct elements of K . Coalition K ⊆ N is a component if (i) it is connected,
and (ii) K ∪ {i} is not connected for every i ∈ N\K . Note that CL (S) is a partition of S.
5 When there is no confusion, we will refer to this solution as well as the payoff vector it assigns to a
permission tree game as hierarchical outcome.
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η j (N , v, T ) = v(F̂T ( j) ∪ { j}) −
∑
h∈FT ( j)
v(F̂T (h) ∪ {h}) for all j ∈ N .
Note that for each j ∈ N it holds that ∑h∈F̂T ( j)∪{ j} η j (N , v, T ) = v(F̂T ( j) ∪ { j}),
implying that η j (N , v, T ) = v({ j}) if FT ( j) = ∅.6
Third we introduce the top value as the solution that for every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT
assigns the worth v(N ) of the grand coalition N fully to the (unique) top player
Top(N , T ), while the other players get a payoff of zero. We denote this solution by
τ .
Definition 3.3 The top value for permission tree games is the solution τ given by
τi (N , v, T ) =
{
v(N ) if i = Top(N , T )
0 if i = Top(N , T )
}
for all (N , v, T ) ∈ GT .
Note that for the permission restricted game (N , rN ,v,T )wehave that rN ,v,T (S) = 0 for
every S ⊆ N \ {Top(N , T )}. From this it follows that τ(N , v, T ) = η(N , rN ,v,T , T ),
i.e., the top value assigns to each (N , v, T ) the hierarchical outcome of the permission
tree game (N , rN ,v,T , T ). Although the top value seems to be extreme, we show in the
next section that it comes out ‘naturally’ by an axiomatic comparison with the other
solutions.
In the remaining of this section, we give the four solutions in terms of the
Harsanyi dividends of the underlying game (N , v). Given a tree (N , T ) ∈ Dt , the
connected hull of a coalition R ⊆ N , denoted by γT (R), is defined as γT (R) =
∩R⊆H⊆N :(H,T (H))∈Dt H , i.e., it is the smallest subtree in (N , T ) containing R. The
permission hull of R, denoted by αT (R), is defined as αT (R) = R ∪ P̂T (R), i.e., it is
the smallest coalition in T containing R.7 Then we have the following results.
Proposition 3.4 1. The Myerson value μ can be written in terms of dividends as




|γT (R)| for all (N , v, T ) ∈ GT and i ∈ N .
2. The hierarchical outcome η can be written in terms of dividends as
ηi (N , v, T ) =
∑
R⊆N :i=Top(γT (R),T (γT (R))
v(R) for all (N , v, T ) ∈ GT and i ∈N .
6 This hierarchical outcome also can be seen as the solution that assigns to every player i its marginal
contribution to the coalition of its subordinates in theMyerson restricted game. In this sense, the hierarchical
outcome can be seen as a solution that is based on a coalition formation process where the players enter
bottom up. For TU-games, solutions based on scenarios of coalition formation are studied in Faigle and
Grabish (2012).
7 In the literature, the set αT (R) is also known as the authorizing set of R in (N , T ).
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3. The top value τ can be written in terms of dividends as
τi (N , v, T ) =
{ ∑
R⊆N :R =∅
v(R) if i = Top(N , T )
0 if i = Top(N , T )
}
for all (N , v, T ) ∈ GT .
4. The permission value ϕ can be written in terms of dividends as:




|αT (R)| for all (N , v, T ) ∈ GT and i ∈ N .
This proposition shows that the Myerson value allocates the dividend of a coalition
R equally over the players in the connected hull of R. This result follows from Owen
(1986). The hierarchical outcome assigns the dividend of a coalition R exclusively to
the top player in the subtree on the connected hull of R. This follows straightforward
from rewriting the expression of the hierarchical outcome in terms of dividends. The
top value assigns the dividend of a coalition R exclusively to the top player in the
subtree on the permission hull of R, which is always the top player of the tree itself.
This follows from the fact that v(N ) = ∑∅=S⊆N v(S). The permission value
allocates the dividend of a coalition R equally over the players in the permission hull
of R. From Gilles et al. (1992), it is known that the dividend of R in the permission
restricted game rN ,v,T is given by
∑
∅=S⊆R:R=αT (S) v(S). Then the result follows
from the fact that ϕ(N , v, T ) = Sh(N , rN ,v,T ).
Example 3.5 We illustrate the four solutions with the permission tree game (N , v, T )
with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, v = u{4,5} the unanimity game on coalition {4, 5}, and
D = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5)} as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The permission value allocates the dividend of coalition {4, 5} equally over the
players in the set αT ({4, 5}) = {1, 3, 4, 5}, giving ϕ(N , v, D) = ( 14 , 0, 14 , 14 , 14 ). The
Myerson value allocates the dividend of coalition {4, 5} equally over the players in
the set γT ({4, 5}) = {3, 4, 5}, giving μ(N , v, D) = (0, 0, 13 , 13 , 13 ). The hierarchical
outcome assigns the dividend fully to the unique ‘highest’ connecting player 3, giving
h(N , v, D) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0). Finally, the top value gives the dividend fully to the
unique top player 1, giving τ(N , v, D) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Fig. 1 Permission tree (N , T )
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4 Characterization of four solutions for permission tree games
In this section, we provide comparable axiomatizations of the three solutions intro-
duced in the previous section and the permission value. We first state the axioms for
a solution f on the class of permission tree games that will be used in characterizing
the four solutions. The first two axioms are standard. Efficiency states that the payoffs
assigned to players must sum to v(N ), the worth of the grand coalition. Additivity
states that the solution applied to the sum of two permission tree games on the same
permission tree (N , T ) gives the same payoff vector as the sum of two payoff vectors
obtained when applying the solution to each of the two permission tree games.
Efficiency For every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT , it holds that
∑
i∈N fi (N , v, T ) = v(N ).
Additivity For every (N , v, T ), (N , w, T ) ∈ GT , it holds that f (N , v + w, T ) =
f (N , v, T ) + f (N , w, T ).
A player i ∈ N is a pending null player in (N , v, T ) ∈ GT if it is both a null player
in game (N , v) (meaning that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}) and a pending
player in the undirected communication graph (N , LT ) (meaning there exists only one
player j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ LT ). Notice that in tree (N , T ), player i is a pending
player if i has no followers. Further, the top player is a pending player if and only if
it has only one follower. Notice that when i is pending on rooted tree (N , T ), then
also the subgraph (N−i , T−i ) is a rooted tree, where (N−i , T−i ) denotes the subtree
(N−i , T (N−i )). The pending null player out property states that pending null players
can be removed from the permission tree gamewithout affecting the payoff distribution
of the other players. The weak version only requires this for those pending null players
that are not the top player.8 Let (N−i , v−i , T−i ) denote the permission tree game given
by the subgame (N−i , v−i ) of (N , v) on the subtree (N−i , T−i ) of (N , T ).
Pending null player out property For every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT , when i is a pending null
player in (N , v, T ), it holds that f j (N , v, T ) = f j (N−i , v−i , T−i ) for all j ∈ N−i .
Weak pending null player out property For every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT , when i ∈
N \ {Top(N , T )} is a pending null player in (N , v, T ), it holds that f j (N , v, T ) =
f j (N−i , v−i , T−i ) for j ∈ N−i .
A player i ∈ N is said to veto player j ∈ N in game (N , v) if v(S∪{ j})−v(S) = 0
for any coalition S ⊆ N−i . Let (N , vij ) be the game derived from (N , v) when player
i vetoes player j , i.e.,
vij (S) =
{
v(S \ { j}) if i /∈ S
v(S) if i ∈ S.
When player i vetoes player j in this way, then the dividend of a coalition R in game
(N , v) such that i /∈ R and j ∈ R is shifted to that of coalition R∪{i} in game (N , vij ).
We therefore have the following expression:
8 For TU-games, Derks and Haller (1999) consider the null player out property meaning that removing a
null player from a TU-game has no effect on the payoffs of the remaining players.
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vij = v +
∑
R⊆N : j∈R
v(R)[uR∪{i} − uR]. (4.1)
Predecessor necessity9 states that the payoff distribution does not change if for a
ordered pair (i, j) ∈ T the game (N , v) is replaced by the game (N , vij ), i.e., if
predecessor i is going to veto follower j . The weak version only requires that the
payoff distribution does not change when i is going to veto his follower j in the game
(N , vij )when in the game (N , v) the marginal contribution of player j to any coalition
that is a subset of his subordinates is zero.
Predecessor necessity For every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT and i, j ∈ N such that (i, j) ∈ T ,
it holds that f (N , v, T ) = f (N , vij , T ).
Weak predecessor necessity For every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT such that (i, j) ∈ T and
v(S ∪ { j}) − v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ F̂T ( j), it holds that f (N , v, T ) = f (N , vij , T ).
A player i ∈ N is called necessary in game (N , v) if v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
The next two axioms are restricted tomonotone games where all players are necessary.
In that case the players are symmetric in the game, but still differ by their position
in the permission tree. For such games the next two axioms reflect extreme ways
of how to handle payoff allocations. The necessary player symmetry axiom requires
that all players get the same payoff10 and so reflects a full egalitarian approach. The
one-player property requires the counterpart that there is at most one player that gets
a nonzero payoff. Together with efficiency, this implies that the full payoff goes to
precisely one player, expressing the most unequal approach.
Necessary player symmetry For every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT with (N , v) monotone and
all players necessary, fi (N , v, T ) = f j (N , v, T ) for all i, j ∈ N .
One-player propertyFor every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT with (N , v)monotone and all players
necessary, there is at most one player j ∈ N such that f j (N , v, T ) = 0.
The last axiom is structural monotonicity. It states that when there is a necessary
player in a monotone game (N , v), then such a player gets at least the same payoff as
each of its subordinates.11
Structural monotonicity For every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT such that (N , v) is monotone,
if i ∈ N is a necessary player in (N , v), then fi (N , v, T ) ≥ f j (N , v, T ) for all
j ∈ F̂T (i).
Before giving the characterizations of the four solutions, we first state a proposition
that will be used.
9 In van den Brink et al. (2015), this axiom is used to axiomatizatize the permission value as well as the
AT-permission value.
10 This is weaker than necessary player symmetry in van den Brink et al. (2015) where this equality is
required for necessary players in any game.
11 This is weaker than the structural monotonicity in van den Brink and Gilles (1996) where this inequality
is required for any player in a monotone game.
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Proposition 4.1 Let ∅ = R ⊆ N and c ∈ IR. Then
(i) For any solution f on the class GT satisfying efficiency and the pending null
player out property, it holds that fi (N , cuR, T ) = 0 if i ∈ N \ γT (R), and
fi (N , cuR, T ) = fi (γT (R), (cuR)γT (R), T (γT (R))) for i ∈ γT (R).
(ii) For any solution f satisfying efficiency and the weak pending null player out
property, it holds that fi (N , cuR, T ) = 0 if i ∈ N \αT (R), and fi (N , cuR, T ) =
fi (αT (R), (cuR)αT (R), T (αT (R))) for i ∈ αT (R).
(iii) For any solution f satisfying predecessor necessity, it holds that f (N , cuR, T ) =
f (N , cuαT (R), T ).
(iv) For any solution f satisfying weak predecessor necessity, it holds that
f (N , cuR, T ) = f (N , cuγT (R), T ).
Proof Consider any permission tree game (N , v, T ) ∈ GT . For any player i ∈ N
being a null player in (N , v) we have v(N ) = v(N−i ) = vN−i (N−i ).
(i) Let i ∈ N be a pending null player. Therefore i is a null player. By efficiency
it holds that
∑
j∈N−i f j (N−i , v−i , T−i ) = v−i (N−i ) = v(N ). By efficiency it also
holds that
∑
j∈N f j (N , v, T ) = v(N ). By the pending null player out property, it holds
that f j (N , v, T ) = f j (N−i , v−i , T−i ) for j ∈ N−i . Therefore∑ j∈N−i f j (N , v, T ) =
v(N ) and thus fi (N , v, T ) = 0. By repeated application of the pending null player out
property and efficiency in this way, it follows that fi (N , cuR, T ) = 0 if i ∈ N \γT (R)
and fi (N , cuR, T ) = fi (γT (R), (cuR)γT (R), T (γT (R))) for i ∈ γT (R).
(ii) It is similar to the proof of (i), but applies the weak pending null player out property
only for pending players that do not have followers.
(iii) and (iv) The proofs follow straightforwardly from repeated application of prede-
cessor necessity and weak predecessor necessity, respectively. unionsq
In the next four theorems, we characterize each of the four values by a subset of
the nine axioms given above. For each of the four theorems, the logical independence
of the used axioms is shown in the Appendix. We first characterize the Myerson value
on the class of permission tree games.
Theorem 4.2 A solution on GT is equal to the Myerson value μ if and only if it
satisfies efficiency, additivity, the pending null player out property, weak predecessor
necessity and necessary player symmetry.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that the Myerson value satisfies efficiency, addi-
tivity, the pending null player out property and necessary player symmetry.
To show that the Myerson value satisfies weak predecessor necessity, we argue
as follows. By Proposition 3.4, μk(N , v, T ) = ∑R⊆N :k∈γT (R) v(R)|γT (R)| for all k ∈
N . Consider those coalitions R such that j ∈ R and i /∈ R, (i, j) ∈
T . Denote by V the collection of these coalitions R such that j ∈ R and
i ∈ γT (R). For R ∈ V it holds that γT (R) = γT (R ∪ {i}). Denote by
W the collection of those coalitions R such that j ∈ R and i /∈ γT (R).
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v(R)|γT (R∪{i})| =
∑




v(R)|γT (R∪{i})| for all k ∈ N .
Let R ∈ W , i.e., j ∈ R and i /∈ γT (R). Since (i, j) ∈ T , we have that R ⊆ F̂T ( j)∪{ j}.
If v(S ∪ { j}) − v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ F̂( j), then we have v(R) = 0. We obtain
μ(N , v, T ) = μ(N , vij , T ), showing that the Myerson value satisfies weak predeces-
sor necessity.
To prove uniqueness, let f be a solution satisfying the axioms. For some c > 0,
first we consider the permission tree game (N , cuR, T ) for a coalition R con-
nected in the underlying undirected communication graph (N , LT ), so R = γT (R).
By Proposition 4.1.(i) and f satisfying efficiency and the pending null player out
property, (i) the players in N \ γT (R) = N \ R obtain a payoff of 0, and (ii)
fi (N , cuR, T ) = fi (R, cuR, T (R)) for all i ∈ R. By efficiency the players in R
together obtain cuR(R) = cuR(N ) = c. Since the players in R are all necessary
players in (R, cuR, T (R)) and cuR is monotone (because c > 0), necessary player
symmetry implies that fi (R, cuR, T (R)) = c|R| for all i ∈ R. Since fi (N , cuR, T ) =
fi (R, cuR, T (R)) for all i ∈ R, f (N , cuR, T ) is uniquely determined for c > 0 and
R connected in (N , LT ).
Now, for some c > 0, consider any coalition R not connected in (N , LT ), so
R = γT (R). By Proposition 4.1.(iv) and f satisfying weak predecessor necessity, it
holds that f (N , cuR, T ) = f (N , cuγT (R), T ). Since γT (R) is a connected coalition
in (N , LT ), f (N , cuγT (R), T ) has been uniquely determined above and therefore also
f (N , cuR, T ) is uniquely determined.
Consider the permission tree game (N , v0, T ), with (N , v0) the null game. By
additivity and the fact that v0 = v0+v0, we have f (N , v0, T ) = f (N , v0+v0, T ) =
f (N , v0, T ) + f (N , v0, T ), and therefore fi (N , v0, T ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Next,
consider (N , cuR, T ) for some c < 0. Since v0 = cuR+(−cuR), it follows from addi-
tivity of f that f (N , cuR, T ) = f (N , v0, T )− f (N ,−cuR, T ) = − f (N ,−cuR, T )
is uniquely determined above because −c > 0, and thus (N ,−cuR) is monotone.
Finally, since for every (N , v, T ) ∈ GT it holds that v can be written as
v = ∑∅=R⊆N v(R)uR , additivity uniquely determines f (N , v, T ) =
∑
∅=R⊆N
f (N ,v(R)uR, T ) for any (N , v, T ) ∈ GT . unionsq
The hierarchical outcome satisfies all axioms in the above theorem except neces-
sary player symmetry. We obtain a characterization of the hierarchical outcome for
permission tree games by replacing necessary player symmetry by the one-player
property and structural monotonicity. Note that the pending null player out property
and necessary player symmetry together imply structural monotonicity, so also the
Myerson value satisfies structural monotonicity.
Theorem 4.3 A solution on GT is equal to the hierarchical outcome η if and only if it
satisfies efficiency, additivity, the pending null player out property, weak predecessor
necessity, structural monotonicity and the one-player property.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that the hierarchical outcome satisfies efficiency,
additivity, the pending null player out property, structural monotonicity and the one-
player property. By arguments similar to the proof that the Myerson value satisfies
weak predecessor necessity, it follows that the hierarchical outcome satisfies weak
predecessor necessity.
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Toproveuniqueness, let f be a solution satisfying the axioms. For some c > 0, again
first we consider the permission tree game (N , cuR, T ) for a coalition R connected
in the underlying undirected communication graph (N , LT ), so R = γT (R). By
Proposition 4.1.(i) and f satisfying efficiency and the pending null player out property,
we obtain that (i) the players in N \ γT (R) = N \ R obtain a payoff of 0, and (ii)
fi (N , cuR, T ) = fi (R, (cuR)R, T (R)) for i ∈ R. Since in (R, (cuR)R) all players are
necessary, we can apply the one player property to obtain that there is only one player
j ∈ R such that f j (R, (cuR)R, T (R)) = 0. Let r0 = Top(R, R(T )) be the top player
in the subtree (R, T (R)). Since (i) r0 is a necessary player in (R, (cuR)R), (ii) every j ∈
R\{r0} is a subordinate of r0 in (R, T (R)), and (iii) cuR is monotone (because c > 0),
structural monotonicity implies that fr0(R, (cu
R)R, T (R)) ≥ f j (R, (cuR)R, T (R))
for all j ∈ R \{r0}. So, the one-player property, structural monotonicity and efficiency
imply that fr0(R, (cu
R)R, T (R)) = c and f j (R, (cuR)R, T (R)) = 0 for all j ∈
R \ {r0}. Therefore f (N , cuR, T ) is uniquely determined.
The cases (i) R = γT (R) and c > 0, (ii) c < 0 and (iii) (N , v, T ) ∈ GT follow
along similar lines to those in the proof of Theorem 4.2 for the Myerson value. unionsq
From the axioms used in Theorem 4.3, the top value satisfies all except the pending
null player out property. The top value is characterized by replacing the pending null
player out property by the weak pending null player out property and by replacing
weak predecessor necessity by predecessor necessity.
Theorem 4.4 A solution on GT is equal to the top value τ if and only if it satisfies
efficiency, additivity, the weak pending null player out property, predecessor necessity,
structural monotonicity and the one-player property.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that the top value satisfies efficiency, additivity,
the weak pending null player out property, structural monotonicity and the one-player
property. The top value satisfying predecessor necessity follows from vij (N ) = v(N )
and the fact that for any two games (N , v, T ) and (N , v′, T ) such that v(N ) = v′(N )
it holds that τ(N , v, T ) = τ(N , v′, T ).
To prove uniqueness, let f be a solution satisfying the axioms. For some c > 0,
first we consider the permission tree game (N , cuR, T ) for a coalition R with R
having full permission in T , so R is equal to the permission hull αT (R). By Propo-
sition 4.1.(ii) and f satisfying efficiency and the weak pending null player out
property, we obtain that (i) the players in N \ αT (R) = N \ R obtain a payoff
of 0, and (ii) fi (N , cuR, T ) = fi (R, (cuR)R, T (R)) for i ∈ R. Since all players
in the game (R, (cuR)R) are necessary, we can apply the one-player property to
obtain that there is only one player j ∈ R such that f j (R, (cuR)R, T (R)) = 0.
Let i0 = Top(N , T ). Since (i) i0 ∈ R (because R = αT (R)), (ii) i0 is neces-
sary in (R, (cuR)R), (iii) every j ∈ R \ {i0} is a subordinate of r0 in (R, T (R)),
and (iv) cuR is monotone (because c > 0), structural monotonicity implies that
fi0(R, (cu
R)R, T (R)) ≥ f j (R, (cuR)R, T (R)) for all j ∈ R \{i0}. So, the one-player
property, structural monotonicity and efficiency imply that fi0(R, (cu
R)R, T (R)) = c
and f j (R, (cuR)R, T (R)) = 0 for all j ∈ R \ {i0}. Therefore, f (N , cuR, T ) is
uniquely determined.
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Next, consider those coalitions R that do not have full permission in (N , T ),
so R = αT (R). By Proposition 4.1.(iv) and f satisfying predecessor necessity, it
holds that f (N , cuR, T ) = f (N , cuαT (R), T ). Since αT (R) has full permission in
(N , T ), f (N , cuαT (R), T ) has been uniquely determined above, and therefore, also
f (N , cuR, T ) is uniquely determined.
The cases c < 0 and (N , v, T ) ∈ GT follow along similar lines to those in the
proof of Theorem 4.2 for the Myerson value. unionsq
Finally, it turns out that the permission value is characterized by replacing the one-
player property in the characterization of the top value by necessary player symmetry.
Further structural monotonicity can be deleted, since the weak pending null player
out property, predecessor necessity and necessary player symmetry together imply
structural monotonicity.
Theorem 4.5 A solution on GT is equal to the permission value ϕ if and only if it
satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak pending null player out property, predecessor
necessity and necessary player symmetry.
Proof The permission value satisfying efficiency, additivity and necessary player
symmetry follows from van den Brink and Gilles (1996),12 ϕ satisfying predeces-
sor necessity follows from van den Brink et al. (2015), and it is straightforward to
show that ϕ satisfies the weak pending null player out property.
To prove uniqueness, let f be a solution satisfying the axioms. For some c > 0,
first we consider the permission tree game (N , cuR, T ) for a coalition R with R =
αT (R), implying that top player i0 ∈ R. By Proposition 4.1.(ii) and f satisfying
efficiency and the weak pending null player out property, we obtain that (i) the players
in N \αT (R) = N \R obtain a payoff of 0, and (ii) fi (N , cuR, T ) = fi (R, cuR, T (R))
for all i ∈ R. By efficiency, the players in R obtain cuR(N ) = c. Since all players
in R are necessary and cuR is monotone, necessary player symmetry implies that
fi (R, cuR, T (R)) = c|R| for every i ∈ R. Since fi (N , cuR, T ) = fi (R, cuR, T (R))
for all i ∈ R, f (N , cuR, T ) is uniquely determined for c > 0 and coalition R with
R = αT (R).
Now consider those coalitions R that do not have full permission in (N , T ),
so R = αT (R). By Proposition 4.1.(iv) and f satisfying predecessor necessity, it
holds that f (N , cuR, T ) = f (N , cuαT (R), T ). Since αT (R) has full permission in
(N , T ), f (N , cuαT (R), T ) has been uniquely determined above, and therefore, also
f (N , cuR, T ) is uniquely determined.
The cases c < 0 and (N , v, T ) ∈ GT follow along similar lines to those in the
proof of Theorem 4.2 for the Myerson value. unionsq
5 Comparing the four solutions
Table 1 gives an overview of the axioms used to characterize the four solutions for
permission tree games (those marked with a ++). Moreover, it shows which other
12 In fact, they prove the stronger necessary player property requiring that a necessary player in a monotone
game with permission structure earns at least as much as any other player.
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Table 1 Axioms satisfied by
the four solutions
μ η τ ϕ
Efficiency ++ ++ ++ ++
Additivity ++ ++ ++ ++
Weak pending null player out + + ++ ++
Weak predecessor necessity ++ ++ + +
Structural monotonicity + ++ ++ +
Pending null player out ++ ++ – –
Predecessor necessity – – ++ ++
Necessary player symmetry ++ – – ++
One-player property – ++ ++ –
axioms are satisfied by the solutions (those marked with a +). In all four axiomati-
zations, we use the first two axioms: efficiency and additivity. All four solutions also
satisfy the next three axioms (second part of Table 1): the weak pending null player
out property, weak predecessor necessity and structural monotonicity. Although not
appearing explicitly in all axiomatizations, the weak pending null player out property
and weak predecessor necessity appear implicitly in all axiomatizations since the two
axiomatizations that do not use the weak pending null player out property use the
stronger pending null player out property, and the two axiomatizations that do not
use weak predecessor necessity use the stronger predecessor necessity. Also structural
monotonicity is satisfied by all solutions, because for the Myerson value structural
monotonicity is implied by necessary player symmetry, the pending null player out
property and efficiency, and for the permission value structuralmonotonicity is implied
by necessary player symmetry, predecessor necessity, theweak pending null player out
property and efficiency. The four solutions are distinguished by the last four axioms
in the table. Each of the four solutions satisfies exactly two of the final four axioms
in the table, and together with the previous axioms, these give an axiomatization of
the corresponding solution. Moreover, each of these four axioms appears in precisely
two axiomatizations.
In the axiomatizations, we used four of six combinations containing two out of
these last four axioms. This leaves two combinations that have not been considered. It
turns out that these two combinations of two out of four axioms are incompatible with
the other axioms. In other words, a solution satisfying efficiency, additivity, the weak
pending null player out property and weak predecessor necessity cannot also satisfy
both the pending null player out property and predecessor necessity nor satisfy both
necessary player symmetry and the one-player property.
Proposition 5.1 There does not exist a solution f satisfying efficiency, additivity, the
pending null player out property, structural monotonicity and predecessor necessity.
Proof Consider a permission tree game (N , u{i}, T ), where |N | > 1 and (N , u{i}) is
the unanimity game of a player i = Top(N , T ). By Proposition 4.1.(i) and f satisfy-
ing efficiency and the pending null player out property, it holds that f j (N , u{i}, T ) = 0
for j ∈ N \ {i}, and fi (N , u{i}, T ) = u{i}(N ) = 1. By repeatedly applying prede-
cessor necessity, we also obtain that f (N , u{i}, T ) = f (N , uαT (i), T ). According
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to structural monotonicity, it holds that 1 = fi (N , u{i}, T ) = fi (N , uαT (i), T ) ≤
f j (N , uαT (i), T ) = f j (N , u{i}, T ) = 0 for j ∈ P̂T (i). Since P̂T (i) = ∅, we obtain a
contradiction and f cannot exist. unionsq
Proposition 5.2 There does not exist a solution f satisfying efficiency, additivity, the
weak pending null player out property, necessary player symmetry, weak predecessor
necessity and the one-player property.
Proof For |N | > 1, consider a permission tree game (N , uN , T ). According to the
one-player property, only one player can have a payoff that is nonzero. Efficiency
implies that the payoff to this player must be uN (N ) = 1. However, necessary player
symmetry implies that fi (N , uN , T ) = f j (N , uN , T ) for any two players i, j ∈ N .
Since in uN all players in N are necessary and |N | > 1, we obtain a contradiction and
f cannot exist. unionsq
In thiswaywe have comparable axiomatizations of the four solutions for permission
tree games. Next, we describe this comparison in more detail.
The pending null player out property is satisfied by the Myerson value and the
hierarchical outcome. It implies that players who do not contribute anything in the
game nor connect any contributing players obtain a zero payoff. This follows from the
communication feature of these two solutions. The permission and top value may still
grant such players a nonzero payoff, by domination of contributing followers. This
follows from the hierarchical feature of these two solutions. This is also shown by these
solutions satisfying predecessor necessity, whereas theMyerson value and hierarchical
outcome do not. Therefore, the Myerson value and the hierarchical outcome may be
thought of as ‘communication solutions,’ whereas the permission value and the top
value might be considered ‘hierarchy solutions’ for permission tree games.
However, this does not imply that ‘bottom players’ will always obtain a higher
payoff from a ‘communication value’ than from a ‘hierarchy value.’ For example, in
a unanimity game uR with R containing at least two bottom players, every bottom
player gets zero payoff according to the hierarchical outcome, but earns a positive
payoff according to the permission value. The reason is that the hierarchical outcome
satisfies the one-player property, which together with the other axioms assigns the full
unanimity payoff to the ‘local’ top player in the connected coalition, i.e., the player in
the coalitionwho is closest to the root,while the permission value assigns equal payoffs
to player j and all of its superiors because it satisfies necessary player symmetry
(together with the other axioms). In this sense, there is another distinction between the
four solutions. On the one hand, the Myerson value and the permission value satisfy
necessary player symmetry, equally distributing the dividend of a coalition among
the players needed to make that coalition feasible. The hierarchical outcome and the
top value on the other hand satisfy the one-player property, assigning the payoff of
a coalition to the unique top player among the players needed to make that coalition
feasible. We summarize this in Fig. 2.
The interpretation of these solutionswith respect to the hierarchy can be looked at in
the following way. The Myerson value and the hierarchical outcome take a more local
approach to hierarchies; coalitions within the hierarchy have some sense of autonomy
in that they can operate without needing their predecessors to sign off on everything
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ϕμ
τη
dividend distributed equally over ‘essential’ players




connected coalitions and superiors
Fig. 2 Solution classifications
they do. The permission value and the top value take a global approach to hierarchies;
everything a coalition does, needs to be approved by players located at a higher position
in the hierarchy. The Myerson value and the permission value interpret the players of
any feasible coalition in the hierarchy to play an equally important role. They should
therefore be rewarded equally. The hierarchical outcome and the top value interpret
the (local or global) top player of any feasible coalition to be the one that is in control;
therefore, this player should obtain all of the rewards. A related observation is that in
case coalition R contains the top (root) player i in some permission tree T , then the
permission hull αT (R) of R coincides with the connected hull γT (R) of R, implying
that μ(N , uR, T ) = ϕ(N , uR, T ) and τ(N , uR, T ) = η(N , uR, T ).
Finally, we note that the local permission value, recently introduced in van den
Brink and Dietz (2014), satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak pending null player
out property, necessary player symmetry and structural monotonicity and so has these
five axioms in common with theMyerson value and the permission value. To illustrate
the difference of this value with the other values, consider, for example, the permission
tree game (N , v, T ) on N = {1, 2, 3, 4}with v = u{3,4} the unanimity game on players
3 and 4, and T = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)} the linear order on four players. The four
values discussed in this paper, respectively, assign payoffs ϕ(N , v, T ) = ( 14 , 14 , 14 , 14 ),
μ(N , v, T ) = (0, 0, 12 , 12 ), η(N , v, T ) = (0, 0, 1, 0) and τ(N , v, T ) = (1, 0, 0, 0).
Whereas in the permission value the players 3 and 4 need permission of all their
superiors implying that the worth 1 is divided among all players in the permission hull
α({3, 4}) = N , according to the local permission value players only need permission of
their predecessors, so the players 3 and 4 need permission of player 2, but permission
of player 1 is not needed. Consequently, the local permission value assigns to this
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6 Appendix: Logical independence of the axioms of the theorems in
Sect. 4
Logical independence of the five axioms stated in Theorem 4.2 is shown by the fol-
lowing alternative solutions for permission tree games.
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1. The solution fi (N , v, T ) = 0, (N , v, T ) ∈ GT , i ∈ N satisfies additivity, the
pending null player out property, weak predecessor necessity and necessary player
symmetry. It does not satisfy efficiency.
2. For (N , v, T ) ∈ GT let Null(v) be the set of null players in v. Let f be the
solution that for (N , v, T ) ∈ GT divides the worth v(N ) of the grand coalition
equally over all non-null players and the players that connect these players in the
graph, and assigns a 0 payoff otherwise. So for (N , v, T ) ∈ GT solution f is given
by fi (N , v, T ) = v(N )|γT (N\Null(v))| for i ∈ γT (N\Null(v)) and fi (N , v, T ) = 0 for
i ∈ N \γT (N\Null(v)). This solution satisfies efficiency, the pending null player
out property, weak predecessor necessity and necessary player symmetry. It does
not satisfy additivity.
3. The permission value satisfies efficiency, additivity, weak predecessor necessity
and necessary player symmetry. It does not satisfy the pending null player out
property.
4. The solution f (N , v, T ) = Sh(N , v), (N , v, T ) ∈ GT satisfies efficiency, addi-
tivity, the pending null player out property and necessary player symmetry. It does
not satisfy weak predecessor necessity.
5. The hierarchical outcome satisfies efficiency, additivity, the pending null player
out property and weak predecessor necessity. It does not satisfy necessary player
symmetry.
Logical independence of the six axioms stated in Theorem 4.3 is shown by the
following alternative solutions for permission tree games.
1. The solution fi (N , v, T ) = 0, (N , v, T ) ∈ GT , i ∈ N satisfies additivity, the pend-
ing null player out property, weak predecessor necessity, structural monotonicity
and the one-player property. It does not satisfy efficiency.
2. Consider the class of games (N , v, T ), for which there is a coalition R ⊆ N such
that v(S) = 0 if γT (S) = R. The solution that on this class of games assigns
the hierarchical outcome and on games not in this class assigns the Myerson
value satisfies efficiency, the pending null player out property, weak predecessor
necessity, structural monotonicity and the one-player property. It does not satisfy
additivity.
3. The top value satisfies efficiency, additivity, weak predecessor necessity, structural
monotonicity and the one-player property. It does not satisfy the pending null
player out property.
4. For a coalition S define A(S) = (γT (S) \ (F̂T (S) ∪ S)) to be those players in
the connected hull γT (S) that are not included in S nor are they subordinates of
players in S. Now consider fi (N , v, T ) = ∑i∈S⊆N :i=Top(γT (S),T (γT (S))) v(S)+∑
∅=S⊆N :i∈A(S),Top(γT (S),T (γT (S)))/∈S
v(S)|A(S)| i ∈ N , (N , v, T ) ∈ GT . This solution
assigns the dividend of coalitions S, such that the top player of the connected
hull γT (S) is included in S uniquely to that top player and equally distributes
the dividend of coalitions S not containing this top player over those players in
the connected hull γT (S) that are not included in S nor are they followers of
players in S. This solution satisfies efficiency, additivity, the pending null player
out property, structuralmonotonicity and theone-player property. It does not satisfy
weak predecessor necessity.
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5. For every coalition S, take any rT (S) ∈ FT (Top(γT (S))) ∩ γT (S) as a ‘represen-
tative’ of coalition S. Consider the solution fi (N , v, T ) = ∑S⊆N :i=rT (S) v(S)
that assigns the dividend v(S) of a coalition S fully to this player rT (S). This
solution satisfies efficiency, additivity, the pending null player out property, weak
predecessor necessity and the one-player property. It does not satisfy structural
monotonicity.
6. TheMyerson value satisfies efficiency, additivity, the pending null player out prop-
erty, weak predecessor necessity and structural monotonicity. It does not satisfy
the one-player property.
Logical independence of the six axioms stated in Theorem 4.4 is shown by the
following alternative solutions for permission tree games.
1. The solution fi (N , v, T ) = 0, (N , v, T ) ∈ GT , i ∈ N satisfies additivity, theweak
pending null player out property, predecessor necessity, structural monotonicity
and the one-player property. It does not satisfy efficiency.
2. Let V be the class of games (N , v, T ), for which there is a coalition R ⊆ N such
that v(S) = 0 if αT (S) = R. The solution that on this class of games assigns
the top value and on games not in this class assigns the permission value satis-
fies efficiency, the weak pending null player out property, predecessor necessity,
structural monotonicity and the one-player property. It does not satisfy additivity.
3. Consider the solution that for (N , v, T ) ∈ GT assigns the dividend v(S) of
coalitions S such thatαT (S) = N toTop(N , T ) anddistributes the dividendv(S)
equally over N otherwise. This solution satisfies efficiency, additivity, predecessor
necessity, structural monotonicity and the one-player property. It does not satisfy
the weak pending null player out property.
4. The hierarchical outcome satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak pending null
player out property, structural monotonicity and the one-player property. It does
not satisfy predecessor necessity.
5. For every coalition S, take any rT (S) ∈ FT (Top(αT (S)))∩αT (S) as a ‘represen-
tative’ of coalition S. Consider the solution fi (N , v, T ) = ∑S⊆N :i=rT (S) v(S)
that assigns the dividend v(S) of a coalition S fully to this player rT (S). This
solution satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak pending null player out property,
predecessor necessity and the one-player property. It does not satisfy structural
monotonicity.
6. The permission value satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak pending null player
out property, predecessor necessity and structural monotonicity. It does not satisfy
the one-player property.
Logical independence of the five axioms stated in Theorem 4.5 is shown by the
following alternative solutions for permission tree games.
1. The solution fi (N , v, T ) = 0, (N , v, T ) ∈ GT , i ∈ N satisfies additivity, the
weak pending null player out property, weak predecessor necessity, structural
monotonicity and the one-player property. It does not satisfy efficiency.
2. The solution that for (N , v, T ) ∈ GT equally divides the worth v(N ) of the grand
coalition over all non-null players and their predecessors in the graph and assigns
a 0 payoff otherwise satisfies efficiency, the weak pending null player out property,
predecessor necessity and necessary player symmetry. It does not satisfy additivity.
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3. The solution that for (N , v, T ) ∈ GT equally divides the worth v(N ) of the grand
coalition over the players in N satisfies efficiency, additivity, predecessor necessity
and necessary player symmetry. It does not satisfy the weak pending null player
out property.
4. The solution f (N , v, T ) = Sh(N , v) satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak
pending null player out property and necessary player symmetry. It does not satisfy
predecessor necessity.
5. The top value satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak pending null player out
property and predecessor necessity. It does not satisfy necessary player symmetry.
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